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Abstract: This paper departs from the traditional portrayal of the relationship between 
economic and social constitutionalism as an antagonistic pair in a never-ending struggle. 
Instead, it propounds a more conciliating thesis in light of the post-Lisbon and ongoing 
developments at EU level, which have advanced social constitutionalism further. The thesis is 
better explained by the concept of symbiotic constitutionalism, which aims at keeping its 
economic and social components in balance. Symbiotic constitutionalism gives effect to the 
social market economy paradigm introduced by the Treaty of Lisbon and acknowledges the 
incremental socialisation of the Union, reawakened in the aftermath of the crisis. Finally, it 
bestows a constitutional telos upon the EU that is not detrimental towards its economic and 
social components. The latter are no longer pitted against each other, but understood as a 
complementary pair. 
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1. INTRODUCTION 
 
The European Union (EU) has in general the potency to exert its influence over social welfare 
matters, despite the lack of a clear-cut competence regime in the field. References to the area 
have gradually been incorporated in the Treaties and the Charter of Fundamental Rights 
(Charter), legitimising welfare at EU level. The fact that this legitimisation has taken place 
through the inclusion of social policy in the Union’s constituent documents, the Treaties, 
renders welfare part of its acquis and values. In turn, the latter act as foundations of the –
contested- EU quasi-constitutional order. Suddenly –but not quite surprisingly- the existential 
debates around the nature of the Union come to surface. These debates range from the broad 
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question on the causality and actuality of a European Constitution, which does not form part 
of this paper, to the more focused ones, revolving around the nature of that constitution. The 
latter often comprise the adversarial relationship between the so-called economic and social 
constitutions, and how this has developed over time.  
The present paper focuses on that relationship, by investigating how social 
considerations have been embedded in the Union’s aims and objectives over time, with 
particular attention paid to the Treaty of Lisbon and the social market economy it envisages for 
the EU, as well as to the new initiatives put forward under the aegis of the Pillar of Social 
Rights. It departs from the traditional portrayal of the relationship between economic and social 
constitutionalism as an antagonistic pair in a never-ending struggle. Instead, it propounds a 
more conciliating thesis in light of the ongoing developments.  It begins by setting out the 
bigger picture behind European constitutionalism, a concept the Union is need of and has 
plausibly achieved to embed. Then emphasis is placed on the seemingly antagonistic prongs of 
that constitution, claiming that aspects of social constitutionalism can interact with their 
economic counterparts, and have done so, though at varying degrees, for a long time.  
Social constitutionalism has been -at least normatively- reinforced post-Lisbon through 
its crystallisation in the social market economy paradigm. Both recent and ongoing reforms 
aim not to overturn but to restrain economic constitutionalism, by causing it to draw level with 
its social counterpart. This allows for the characterisation of the relationship between the 
economic and social policies of the Union as one of symbiotic constitutionalism, whereby even 
the prima facie liberal Court of Justice of the EU (CJEU/Court) of Viking and Laval has been 
metamorphosed to a certain extent.1 The emergence of symbiotic constitutionalism as the new 
modus operandi of the EU constitutional order, may finally give effect to the social market 
economy paradigm embedded in the Treaties. It also bestows a constitutional telos upon the 
Union that is not detrimental towards the economic and social constituents of the European 
project, with all the negative consequences this might have had for the economy and society. 
It essentially aims at buttressing a harmonious coexistence of the two.  
 
2. THE IDEA OF THE EUROPEAN CONSTITUTION 
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European constitutionalism is inextricably linked to the challenging quest for the constitution 
of the EU, 2 a quest that has its roots in the concept of that new legal order the then European 
Communities established, as coined by the CJEU in its two most cited judgments of Van Gend 
and Costa.3 EU law can be autonomous, with its own constitutional principles and laws, at least 
according to some.4 The CJEU further proclaimed the Treaties as the constitutional pillar of 
the Union.5 Yet the Constitutional Treaty failed to materialise, partly due to the Union’s and 
Member States’ ‘immaturity’ despite their high ambitions, and partly due to their peoples’ 
misguided views on its impact.6 The fact that the Lisbon reforms incorporated most of the 
failed Constitutional Treaty’s aspects, save for the more state-like elements, shows that the 
latter had come a little too early, in the sense that Member States were not prepared for such a 
symbolic commitment.   
Narratives on the European demos accentuate the image of a pluralistic European 
society.7 Nonetheless, seeking to assert a proper pan-European (federal) state formation in 
classic terms is a challenge.8 This crudely shows how difficult it is to legitimise actions on 
behalf of the EU institutions, even though in abstract terms the Union could be perceived as a 
sui generis form of a state; a peculiar, distinct, post-Westphalian and post-modern kind of the 
same species.9 The absence of an explicit Constitution proves problematic. Grimm, years ago, 
criticised the oxymoronic situations of EU scholars complaining about the lack of a formal 
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constitution yet simultaneously granting such status to the Treaties.10 For some international 
lawyers what has been put forward is nothing but a sophisticated manifestation of public 
international law, the Treaties encapsulating the latter’s norms.11  
Nevertheless, the majority of the academic community has come to the conclusion that 
constitutional traits form part of the European acquis.12 Furthermore, these traits are embedded 
in the texts of the Treaties, acquiring a distinct meaning, ‘better explained with a constitutional 
vocabulary than with that of international law’.13 Precisely, to what extent these have partaken 
in forging the so-called European constitutional order merely depends on each author.14 As 
Snyder puts it, the EU constitution cannot be purely confined by words, but instead it consists 
of an ongoing process.15 The idiosyncratic character of the EU setting and of its legal order’s 
development as the variables resulting in diverse worldviews on the issue led Maduro to write 
that European constitutionalism is under an existential crisis.16 Shall it be more profound, or 
more deferential towards the Member States? Limited or overarching? These are the core 
indicators to be considered when calibrating Europe’s constitutional compass, pinpointing to 
the overall direction the European project is to take in the future.  
  
3. THE EU’S ECONOMIC AND SOCIAL CONSTITUTIONS  
3.1. THE EU’S ECONOMIC AND SOCIAL CONSTITUTIONS  
 
The facets of this existential crisis which are most relevant to this paper are those that deal with 
the notions of economic and social constitutionalism as components of the EU constitutional 
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Steve Peers eds, Oxford University Press 2014). That is what Craig coins as the transformation 
thesis: P. Craig, Constitutions, Constitutionalism, and the European Union, 7(2) European Law 
Journal 125, 134 (2001). 
13 J. H. H. Weiler, On the power of the Word: Europe’s constitutional iconography, 3 (2-3) 
International Journal of Constitutional Law 173, 176 (2005). 
14 For an overview of the core approaches see: K. Tuori, European Constitutionalism (CUP 
2015). 
15 F. Snyder, Editorial: Is the European Constitution Dead?, 10(3) European Law Journal 255 
(2004). 
16 M. Poiares Maduro, Europe and the constitution: what if this is as good as it gets, in 
European Constitutionalism beyond the State 77 (J. H. H. Weiler & M. Wind eds, Cambridge 
University Press 2003). 
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paradigm. Their relationship is –or, better, can be- rather contentious. The former has its roots 
mainly in the ordoliberal and functionalist theories that shaped the Union’s development since 
the start, providing it with a defence for its economic and market-based technocratic initiatives 
and actions, by shielding those ‘from the vicissitudes of politics, whether quotidian or 
millennial’.17 On the other hand, a complete idea(l) of European constitutionalism shall also 
take into account its social aspects –at least partly normatively,18 and it is here where social 
constitutionalism comes handy, to enrich such connotations and embed them into the Union’s 
aims and objectives.19  
The interplay between these two concepts takes the form of an antagonistic relationship. 
Functionalist and ordoliberal underpinnings are in a stark contrast with most social ones, the 
latter having traditionally and in principle a rather limited space dedicated to them. On the other 
hand, if the Union aspires to be a full-frills federation, and not a merely enhanced economic 
community, social considerations shall be embedded into its laws and principles of 
constitutional nature and value. The EU has long been perceived as being ‘a prisoner of its 
initially economic orientation’,20 giving priority to economic, financial and market 
considerations over social and political ones. Over time, the popularity of this view decreased, 
giving room to more pluralistic views of European constitutionalism, which no longer 
exclusively revolve around the concept of a single internal market, sometimes reinterpreting 
the latter in a more varied way.21 The constitutional discourse and landscape gradually evolved 
in order to accommodate and adapt to the changes and the areas that the Union has brought 
under its umbrella, welfare being one of them. 
 
3.2. THE EMERGENCE OF THE SOCIAL CONSTITUTION  
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Judicial Engagement 301 (L. Lazarus, C. McCrudden & N. Bowles eds, Hart Publishing 2014). 
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culture, in European Constitutionalism beyond the State 55 (J. H. H. Weiler & M. Wind eds, 
Cambridge University Press 2003). 
20 Ibid, 71. 
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The move towards the inclusion of social constitutionalism in the discourse was not random. 
Neither random was the -admittedly incremental- pace through which its elements were 
incorporated into the relevant discussions. The Union kicked off as an economic community 
with limited –if not non-existent- competences in the area of social policy. Even when social 
policy was affected, most of the time this constituted a derivative outcome of the EU’s 
economic integration.22 Social policy was a late bloomer, accompanied by patchy and 
inconsistent developments in that regard, rendering self-explanatory why it took welfare so 
long to take part in the constitutionalism debate. Nowadays the social dimension of Europe is 
linked to what has been dubbed as the social constitution of the EU, one of the many 
components of the European constitution; welfare considerations have become part of the 
Union’s objectives.23  
While it can be argued that aspects of social policy are only partially regulated at EU 
level, the fact that a Unionisation of national functions has occurred, limiting Member State 
initiatives in such areas, highlights the widening scope of the EU constitutional provisions.24 
Even though Member States at first might have been caught off guard by the reach of the 
Union’s powers in an area, they have now overall conceded to its involvement therein. This 
resembles a quasi-blank cheque given to the EU to act as a normatively higher authority. In 
other words, it consists of a retroactive ratification of the social contract between the EU and 
its Member States, bestowing on it the necessary blessing to start crafting an all-around and 
ever-expanding, though not incontestably, constitution, a constitution where social 
perspectives are welcomed and embedded within. 
 Social perspectives inevitably bring into the discussion the paradigm of socially 
embedded constitutionalism. It is a departure from the paradigm of embedded liberalism the 
EU had adopted with the Spaak Report and the Treaty of Rome. In socially embedded 
constitutionalism, social rights are at the forefront in order to reinforce societal integration 
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Treaties, 5 Revue Française des Affaires Sociales 119 (2006). 
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Working Paper 5/04 2004). 
 7 
through the constitution’s provisions.25 These entail aims that go beyond the scope of classical 
human rights, governing labour relations and ‘embrac[ing] policy aims going beyond the 
economic sphere [such as] social inclusion, combating inequality and poverty, diminishing 
unemployment and environmental and economic sustainability’.26 All these have been labelled 
by Schiek as foundational milestones, laying the groundwork for a complete multi-level EU 
social policy.27 The latter has become more mainstream, gaining a place in the European 
constitutional framework, providing a conceptual contribution towards reinforcing Europe’s 
social dimension.28  
This dimension is not only confronted by the economic imperatives of the Union to 
some extent, as argued infra, but also by the Member States themselves. The latter may not 
want to see their powers in the area of welfare becoming encroached by an oh-so powerful EU. 
This was the reason behind social considerations being in the middle of Fitzpatrick’s converse 
pyramid of the EU.29 Yet, as it now stands, social policy has been enhanced since the time of 
his writings, showing a more interventionist –and perhaps integrationist- Europe, with the 
Court, at times –though far from always, taking a pro-welfare stance when attempting to bend 
Member State political unwillingness in the area. This leaves the pervasiveness and longevity 
of economic constitutionalism and its underpinnings as the main hurdles in the quest for social 
constitutionalism in modern-day Europe. Social Europe’s existence in the EU landscape as 
well as its viability crucially depend on the denouement of their interaction. A prevailing 
economic constitution would equal a welfare policy subordinated to the market, whereas the 
emergence and consequent embracing of a self-standing social constitutionalism would allow 
for it to take its own place in the Union’s agenda.  
 
3.3. THE ECONOMIC V SOCIAL CONSTITUTIONALISM DEBATES  
 
                                                      
25 D. Schieck, Re-embedding economic and social constitutionalism: Normative perspectives 
for the EU, in European Economic and Social Constitutionalism after the Treaty of Lisbon 38 
(D. Schiek, U. Liebert & H. Schneider eds, Cambridge University Press 2011). For the 
embedded liberalism period see: S. Giubboni, Social Rights and Market Freedom in the 
European Constitution: A Labour Law Perspective 29-34 (Cambridge University Press 2009). 
26 D. Schiek, Ibid., 41. 
27 Ibid. 
28 J. Shaw, Introduction, in Social Law and Policy in an Evolving European Union 4 (J. Shaw ed, 
Hart Publishing 2000). 
29 B. Fitzpatrick, Converse Pyramids and the European Social Constitution, in in Social Law and 
Policy in an Evolving European Union 323 (J. Shaw ed, Hart Publishing 2000). 
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 Notwithstanding the above, the debate for the prevailing kind of European 
constitutionalism is not homogenous. Inasmuch as the notion of the European constitution 
remains unspecified,30 things follow the same pattern regarding the socio-economic nature of 
the European constitution. The academic discourse is divided in various streams, the first being 
one that perceives economic constitutionalism as the primordial paradigm at EU level, which 
still holds strong, despite the ever-expanding incorporation of social considerations by the 
European institutions.31 Although no uniform position can be found therein, common 
characteristics of such views are the acknowledgment of its German ordoliberal origins, the 
embeddedness of a market oriented quasi-(neo)liberal approach, as well as of its renewed 
influence, particularly within the Economic and Monetary Union (EMU) and in the course of 
the crisis.32 Economic, and more specifically market, integration reigns above everything else, 
social policy included.33 This worldview had been embedded into the first Treaties, that in the 
past were blatantly lacking in embracing political and social constitutional elements.34  
The lack of incorporating social concerns has progressively changed, at least for some 
authors, with the shift of focus of the EU to encompass and be involved in more and more 
areas, leading them to express their eulogies towards it.35 Yet others contend that nothing has 
substantially changed and the neoliberal policies entrenched in the economic constitution 
actively restrict any pro-welfare initiative.36 Even those adopted under the Lisbon strategy, 
namely the Open Method of Coordination (OMC), seem in a way to underlie economic 
rationales; behind a social façade and a shift from harmonisation to a new regulatory 
framework, the ulterior market-oriented goal for performance optimisation remains.37 
Triggered by the Laval Quartet, some observed a shift of political economies, with the one of 
                                                      
30 Weiler, supra n. 2. 
31 G. Majone, The European Community Between Social Policy and Social Regulation, 31(2) 
Journal of Common Market Studies 153 (1993). 
32 T. Prosser, The Economic Constitution 11-14 (Oxford University Press 2014). 
33 W. Sauter & H. Schepel, State and Market in European Union Law 12 (Cambridge University 
Press 2009). 
34 W. Sauter, The Economic Constitution of the European Union, 4 Columbia Journal of 
European Law 27 (1998). 
35 C. Joerges, What is Left of the European Economic Constitution? A Melancholic Eulogy, 30 
European Law Review 461 (2005). 
36 R. Pye & O. Parker, The Unfulfilled Promise of Social Rights in Crisis EU, SPERI Paper No. 26, 
12 (2016). 
37 W. Walters & J. Henrik-Haahr, Governing Europe: Discourse Governmentality and European 
Integration 120 (Routledge 2005). 
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neoclassicism surfacing, advancing deregulation of labour laws and social policies.38 
Nevertheless, not all share the same –pessimistic- view. Instead, a few scholars claim that the 
constitutionalisation of the market that took place actually imposed limits on how far economic 
imperative can go, necessitating regulators to assimilate non-economic values therein; for them 
economic constitutionalism acts as a safety net.39 
 The emergence of the notion of Social Europe in the late 1980s turned the spotlight into 
narratives that focused on the existence of a social dimension in the constitutionalism debate, 
something that was reinforced by the subsequent Treaty amendments, which included various 
articles making reference to areas of social policy. Despite these changes, some authors, while 
acknowledging the new tension, cannot help but perceive it as unviable in the long run. The 
stand-alone welfare-related provisions are patchy for them, and their underpinning rationale is 
rather weak to support a distinct constitutional model.40 In contrast with those affirming the 
existence of a pure economic constitutional paradigm, scholars of that category tend to concede 
that traces of social constitutionalism do exist.41  
However, the fact that Member States still enjoy a plethora of powers in social policy 
led them to observe the subordination of the social to the economic constitution. Social 
constitutionalism is an ‘eternal loser’ or a ‘constitutional underdog’, found trapped in an 
uneven relationship with its economic counterpart.42 This is contrary to what happens at 
Member State level, whose constitutions ‘accord economic and social consideration equal 
constitutional statues in political discourse and decision-making’.43  
Scharpf’s fundamental asymmetry’s roots are found herein. The asymmetry involves 
the highly harmonised aspects of the economic constitution versus those of the social, which 
are predominantly rooted at national level. The latter can never reach the ‘glory’ of the former 
                                                      
38 S Deakin, The Lisbon Treaty, the Viking and Laval Judgments and the Financial Crisis: In 
Search of New Foundations for Europe’s ‘Social Market Economy’, in The Lisbon Treaty and 
Social Europe 29-31 (N. Bruun, K. Loercher & I. Schoemann eds, Hart Publishing 2012). 
39 N. N. Shuibhne, The Resilience of EU Market Citizenship, 47 Common Market Law Review 
1597, 1608 (201); F. de Cecco, State Aid and the European Economic Constitution 17 (Hart 
Publishing 2013). 
40 K. Tuori, European Social Constitution: Between Solidarity and Access Justice in Varieties of 
European Economic Law and Regulation; Liber Amicorum for Hans Micklitz 371-3 (K. 
Purnhagen & P. Rott eds, Springer 2013). 
41 K. Tuori, European Constitutionalism, 229 (Cambridge University Press 2015). 
42 K. Tuori & K. Tuori, The Eurozone Crisis: A Constitutional Analysis 231-2 (Cambridge 
University Press 2014). 
43 Ibid, 233. 
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as only minimum harmonisation can take place for national and political, but also structural, 
reasons.44 For him, as well as for the rest of the scholars of this stream, a constitutionalised 
European social policy is doomed to remain atrophic, despite recent efforts to grant it a more 
important place in the Union’s constitutional discourse. According to their views, social 
constitutionalism is like a sandcastle, slowly destroyed by the rising tide of economic 
imperatives; its footprint might remain, but it is almost impossible for it to fully resist the 
market forces.45 Not is all lost though; integrating theories of multilevel constitutionalism in 
this cluster provide a less dystopic image of the future. Member States’ constitutional 
guarantees for welfare could safeguard its existence in transnational settings.46 
 Regardless of the above, there’s another stream in the literature, for which social 
constitutionalism’s development is sophisticated enough to provide welfare with its own 
distinct constitutional legitimisation, not appreciably subjected to the economic one. Market-
making and regulating through negative integration resulted in a series of harmonising 
measures, affecting areas of social policy such as equality and working conditions.47 At the 
same time, this allows Member States to adopt policies depending on the prevailing 
circumstances, not necessarily contravening welfare expansion within the remits of the 
Union.48  
The entry into force of the Lisbon Treaty saw social market economy put forward as 
the envisaged paradigm for the development of the European Social Model. While some of its 
themes might be limiting as to the direction the Union and its Member States shall take towards 
welfare, prescribing a particular type of social constitutionalism for the EU, its significance 
cannot be overlooked. This is a milestone for a more symmetrical constitutionalisation of the 
                                                      
44 F. Scharpf, The European Social Model: Coping with the challenges of diversity, MPIfG 
Working Paper, No. 02/8 (2002); F. Scharpf, The Double Asymmetry of European Integration; 
Or: Why the EU Cannot Be a Social Market Economy, MPIfG Working Paper, No. 09/12 (2009). 
45 S. Giubboni, Social Rights and Market Freedom in the European Constitution: A Labour Law 
Perspective 259-263 (Cambridge University Press 2006). 
46 N. Walker, Multilevel Constitutionalism: Looking Beyond the German Debate, LEQS Paper 
No. 08/2009 (2009). 
47 J. Shaw, J. Hunt & C. Wallace, Economic and Social Law of the European Union 344 (Palgrave 
Macmillan 2007) Although this might lead to a race to the bottom according to C. Barnard, 
Social Dumping and the Race to the Bottom: Some Lessons for the European Union from 
Delaware? 25 European Law Review 57 (2000). 
48 C. Joerges & F. Roedl, “Social Market Economy” as Europe’s Social Model?, in A European 
Social Citizenship? Preconditions for Future Policies from a Historical Perspective 127 (L. 
Magnusson & B. Strath eds, Peter Lang 2004). 
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Sozialstaat in Europe, vis-à-vis the already established economic one.49 Despite the failed 
Constitutional Treaty, the inclusion of social rights in the Charter of Fundamental Rights, and 
the latter’s Treaty-like status with the Lisbon reforms further planted a solid ground for a 
coherent and distinct European Social Model.50  
Constitutionalised social rights may create a strong impetus for more cohesive and all-
around welfare initiatives at EU level.51 Nevertheless, policy change should not be attributed 
solely to recent developments. Schiek, for example, asserts the existence of humane socio-
economic amalgamations since the start of the European project, drawing on its foundational 
declarations and the key philosophical underpinnings that affected its creation, which have now 
been embodied in various Treaty provisions.52 While acknowledging the hiatus from those 
values especially during the 2008 crisis, but also in the period preceding it with the Court being 
a liberalising actor therein, she observes that the gap is not irreparable. The social seeds of the 
Union can still be found in its constitution, the Treaties and the Charter, which, coupled with a 
gradual departure from ordoliberalism by the CJEU in some areas,53 highlight that an 
autonomous social constitution might already be a reality.54 
 
4. A MORE SOCIAL VIEW OF EUROPE  
 
The more social view of the European constitution that emerged in the last couple of decades 
should not strike as odd. It was triggered by the changes that occurred in the EU landscape at 
a legal and political level. Politically, the emergence of social democratic, third way and in 
general, pro-welfare parties right before the new millennium gave rise to a change of narratives, 
                                                      
49 Ibid, 137-140. 
50 Giubboni, supra n. 45, at 272-273. Although sometimes with limited effects as seen in Case 
C-176/12 AMS [2014] ECLI:EU:C:2014:2 for example. 
51 A. Lo Faro, Regulating Social Europe: Reality and Myth of Collective Bargaining in the EC 
Legal Order, 147 (Hart 2000); S. Sciarra, Collective Agreements in the Hierarchy of European 
Community Sources, in European Community Labour Law: Principles and Perspectives. Liber 
Amicorum Lord Wedderburn of Charlton 211 (P. Davies, A. Lyon-Caen, S. Sciarra, & S. Simitis 
eds, Clarendon Press 1997). 
52 D. Schiek, A Constitution for Social Governance in the European Union in The Human Face 
of the European Union. Are EU Law and Policy Humane Enough? (D. Kostakopoulou & N. 
Ferreira eds, Cambridge University Press 2016). 
53 Case C-115/14 RegioPost [2016] ECLI:EU:C:2015:760. 
54 Schiek, supra n. 52. 
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with audible voices promulgating a less neoliberal and more social Europe.55 The initiatives 
adopted during that time exemplified the will of those policy-makers to leave their pro-welfare 
mark. The OMC, the inclusion of social rights in the Charter, the Lisbon Strategy and, later on, 
Europe 2020 all enhanced the Union’s involvement in the field and were amongst the most 
comprehensive, if not overdue, efforts to render the EU more social.56  
These initiatives were further concretised at constitutional level by the failed 
Constitutional Treaty and the subsequent Lisbon reforms, whereby the Charter became 
binding, the social competence of the EU were expanded and systemised, with the horizontal 
social clause of Article 9 TFEU serving as the guardian of welfare, by “plac[ing] several 
emblematic social policy areas safely beyond the reach of economic law”.57 Finally, a safe 
haven was found for social policy to figure more prominently in what was a disproportionately 
economic Union. The Lisbon Treaty did not produce this change solely through the more 
policy-specific level of specialised chapters. The rather symbolic notion of social market 
economy, another remnant of the unsuccessful Constitutional Treaty, found its place in Article 
3(3) TEU, replacing the ‘open market economy with free competition’ of the former Article 
4(1) TEC. This, at least prima facie, was seen as heralding a new era for welfare in Europe, an 
era where the social constitution was gaining more and more momentum in the European 
constitutionalism debate, leading to some of the discussions presented supra. 
 Before digging deeper into the contribution of the concept to the development of Social 
Europe, it is important to give expression to it, as it is not defined in the Treaties. Joerges has 
written extensively on the issue. For him, social market economy carries positive 
characteristics that can be traced back to its German roots, where it represented a primitive 
form of third way politics, balancing (neo)-liberal urges with depictions of pure socialism.58 It 
is easy to see why politics of that new form of social democracy, of the modern third way 
movement, were inspired by their predecessors. Problem is, according to the same author that 
the EU powers are not so widespread as to enable this objective to materialise.59 The Lisbon 
                                                      
55 D. Castiglione, From the Charter to the Constitution of Europe? Notes on the 
Constitutionalisation Process in the EU, Queen’s Papers on Europeanisation, No. 5/2002 4 
(2002). 
56 Tuori & Tuori, supra n. 45, at 152-157. 
57 P. Vielle, The Horizontal Social Clause, in The Lisbon Treaty and Social Europe 121 (N. Bruun, 
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reforms have helped to tighten the strings of the Union’s competences and forge the necessary 
impetus, but further measures need to be adopted to allow the EU institutions to regulate 
welfare to the same extent as economic integration.  
So why is mentioning the concept of social market economy important if it is, at least 
for the time being, unachievable? Lianos expresses a modest view, that of careful transition 
from social market economy as a key Union objective under the Constitutional Treaty to it 
being ‘a means for the completion of other objectives’ under the current Treaty provision.60 It 
could represent a sign of self-awareness by the drafters that things are not mature enough for 
it to herald a new era. Or even, that before becoming an explicit aim, it should be used as the 
means to pave the way for social market economy to materialise. To be the Trojan horse for its 
traits to invade the Hayekian stronghold of European integration, and try to break the dividing 
wall of supranationalising welfare through diminishing social standards, the preferred route 
paved through the principally decentralised taxation and redistribution regimes among the 
Member States.61 
 These hurdles that the constitutionalisation of the social has to overcome create a dead-
end for some scholars, drawing parallels with the streams of discourse advancing the 
uncontested authority of economic constitutionalism or the subordination to it of its social peer. 
The embeddedness and longevity of economic considerations into the EU model of governance 
has turned them into structural components of it. It is this fact which buttresses Scharpf’s socio-
economic asymmetry of EU law and acts as an impasse for the creation of a complete European 
Social Model.62 Because of their structural embeddedness, any change to their surrounding 
circumstances, be it institutional or political, can only incur little or no impact on them. 
Employing a similar line of reasoning, Roedl suggests that the foundations of the compromise 
between welfare and labour on the one hand, and market and capital on the other, have been 
eroded, although not irreparably.63  
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There are still chances for this social compromise to be reinstated at the EU level this 
time, for Social Europe to emerge as an equal counterpart to market-enforcing Europe. The 
inclusion of the term social market economy in the Treaties has the potential to do just that, 
which is quintessential for ‘the social acceptance of the Union as a legitimate order’.64 This 
would have even higher chances of happening, if those advocating for the more socially just 
model could look beyond the confines of the traditional welfare-cum-nation state example and 
adopt a ‘new post-national approach to Social Europe’.65 Thus, by advancing the concept of 
social market economy, the paradigm of Social Europe could be pushed forward as well, 
together with the legitimacy of the EU and the latter’s unabridged constitutional aspirations.  
All is not lost –yet-, or so it seems to be the case. 
 Fortunately, there is, as has been set out just above, a counterweight to the rather 
gloomy deterministic theories in regards to the future of Social Europe and the contribution 
that the placing of social market economy in the text of the Treaties has made in that regard. 
The counterweight is found in views asserting that the change introduced thereafter was not 
superficial, but instead has the potential to become significant. Social market economy brought 
a telos to the idea of a European social policy and social constitutionalism more than ever 
before. The term was incorporated in the Treaties to act above all as a constitutional principle 
for the Union, equilibrating economic constitutionalism; or so was the plan by its drafters.66  
The argument can be further strengthened if one looks at how Article 3(3) TEU and 
social market economy interact with other concepts also reinforced during the Lisbon reforms 
such as solidarity, social equality and the Charter, distinguishing the envisaged idea(l) of Social 
Europe from its American counterparts.67 This cumulative approach has been embraced even 
by scholars that see little meaning in the –anachronistic per their view- idea of social market 
economy, since it can be perceived as a statement on behalf of the EU for a more serious 
commitment towards social integration.68  
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Notwithstanding that, there is a danger lurking in that Member States might lose the 
largest chunk of their authority on social policy. This takes politics out of the equation and 
assumes that the EU is capable to deal with the matter on its own.69 Such a scenario recalls the 
criticisms towards a politically delegitimised Union, risking becoming deadlocked due to the 
structurally-embedded asymmetries discussed earlier. These create inherent biases towards the 
role welfare plays in the internal market, which can easily distort and, potentially stall the 
objectives behind the inclusion of social market economy in the Treaties.70 Stalling those 
objectives would equal stalling the development of the social prong of the EU’s constitution. 
 
5. THE ROLE OF THE COURT OF JUSTICE OF THE EU (CJEU)  
 
The impetus for a more profound social constitutional component that was stimulated by the 
recent reforms can be jeopardised by the jurisprudence of the CJEU, according to some. For 
Scharpf that judge-made law promoting negative integration is, and has always been, 
destructive for social considerations, prompting a race to the bottom, which affected the most 
pro-welfare of the Member States.71 The Court, for him, mainly disregarded the change in the 
Treaties, representing a liberal Leviathan that can shatter the social market economy chimera.  
The number of academics pointing towards that direction has substantially increased in 
the aftermath of the Laval Quartet, wherein the CJEU was seen as a fierce supporter of the laws 
of the market and free competition, heavily undermining pro-welfare principles found in 
industrial relations and labour rights, to the point of rendering their reconciliation almost 
impossible.72 Not only that, but through its case law, as the judicial actor of the EU, the Court 
can negatively impact the much needed reorientation, thus going against the social market 
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objectives now entrenched in the Treaties. Such an approach would risk showing an EU 
‘committed not to a social, but to a strictly neo-liberal, market economy’, where social rights 
are subordinate to the economic freedoms.73 This scenario might be a bit far-fetched, 
considering the absence of an explicit constitutional court’s status and mandate accorded to the 
CJEU. That notwithstanding, the Court’s normative function should have been to correct 
through its case-law the ‘democracy failures’ of the Member States, and not to undertake a 
value comparison between the social and economic spheres of the Union, as it did in the Laval 
Quartet.74 For these authors the CJEU is the party crasher that came to draw an end to a short-
lived social euphoria. 
 While it is difficult to disregard the negative consequences of past CJEU rulings on 
social policy, there are areas where the CJEU actually enhanced social integration, such as 
through its non-discrimination case-law.75 This proves that further socialisation of the EU 
project can become a reality. Nonetheless the lack of homogeneous political imperatives at EU 
level hinders deeper integration and harmonisation in areas other than the pure-market related 
ones.76 The lack of more clear-cut social competences at EU level is a manifestation of that, in 
combination with the stark divergence among the various welfare regimes of the Member 
States.  
This potential pitfall has not detracted others from expressing a different reflection on 
the Court’s role in regards to social constitutionalism. Caporaso and Tarrow attempted to 
reinvent the CJEU’s contribution to labour mobility by employing the theories of Polanyi, 
Ruggie and their followers. They found that their work can be applied in the post-war EU 
setting, leading to a Court that re-embeds rather than dis-embeds the social integration 
process.77 By looking at different case-law of the Court, it was easier for them to come to that 
conclusion, showing that the CJEU can exhibit different tendencies at different –or even the 
same- time(s). They assume that conflicts between the market and welfare are bound to be 
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omnipresent, yet without implying that the judges’ stance would be linear.78 Instead, the CJEU 
has changed from a predominantly neoliberal institution to a more welfare-conscious one, 
taking into account social considerations, and, thence, blurring the line between market and 
social policy, reflecting the changes in the Treaties.79 Yet this is not always the case, with its 
jurisprudence going back and forth between the economic and the social depending on the area 
of the case at issue.80 It is a Court that somewhat adapts to the changes of its environment, 
albeit at a slower, and rather temperamental and piecemeal pace.  
 The Court, according to Everson, started to adapt even before the entry into force of the 
Lisbon Treaty and the concept of social market economy. The deepening market integration 
resulted to conflicts between EU law and national welfare –among other- measures. Conflicts 
that reached the doors of the CJEU expected from it ‘to subdue political and social pluralism 
within the internal market, but [notwithstanding that it is] lacking a firm (pre-political) 
normative basis from which it might educe legitimacy for its actions’.81 For her, the fact that 
the Court has the capacity to decide on the social orientation of the European constitution is 
the result of a self-inflicted, autopoietic process. This process can be flawed from a legitimacy 
perspective, as the constitutional responsibility undertaken by an institution such as the CJEU 
is lacking in political and democratic justifications, disparaging constitutional matters to being 
merely regulatory ones.82  
Yet on the basis of what has been mentioned above concerning its gradual adaptation 
to social developments, the Court, though lacking direct accountability, might not be as 
apolitical as it appears at first glance to be. Because of that, and bearing in mind that key social 
integration disputes are likely to reach the Court, the latter, in view of the lack of an imminent 
political coming-together, might be an apt actor to promote social constitutionalism in the short 
                                                      
78 Ibid, 598. 
79 Ibid, 613-614. Started primarily from the Advocate Generals, first with AG Villalon’s opinion 
in C-515/08 Santos Palhota and Others [2010] ECR I-9133. Also reflected in some of its recent 
case law such as: C-115/14 RegioPost [2015] ECLI:EU:C:2015:760.  
80 D. Schiek, Towards More Resilience for a Social EU – the Constitutionally Conditioned 
Internal Market, 13(4) European Constitutional Law Review 611 (2017). 
81 M. Everson, Social pluralism and the European Court of Justice: A Court between a rock and 
a hard place, 8(4) The Journal of Legislative Studies 98, 100 (2002). 
82 De Witte, supra n. 70, at 19; A. Somek, Engineering Equality: An Essay on European Anti-
Discrimination Law, (OUP 2011); M. Roennmar, Labour and equality law, in European Union 
Law, 604-609 (C. Barnard & S. Peers eds, Oxford University Press 2014). 
 18 
term.83 It can do so by trying to conform to the new social objectives, amalgamated in the 
Treaties, the social chapter of the Charter and the proposals that came with the Pillar of Social 
Rights. After all, it was the CJEU through its jurisprudence that proclaimed the autonomy of 
the EU legal order, that took on the role of its constitutional Messiah.84  
 
6. THE IDEA OF SYMBIOTIC CONSTITUTIONALISM  
 
It is true that there might be a discrepancy between the embracing of the economic and social 
aspects of the European constitution, but the two are not irreconcilable, especially taking into 
account the ongoing developments surrounding in particular the social prong of the European 
project. The EU might be a long way from ensuring total parity between market and social 
integration, yet it has also come a long way in that regard. The initiatives taken in the 1980s 
and 1990s set the foundations for a more serious debate on the nature of social constitutionalism 
at EU level, exemplified by the inclusion of social market economy and other welfare-related 
principles in the Treaties post-Lisbon. The changes did not stop there, and throughout the crisis 
a renewed interest emerged on how those worse-off could be protected, how the EMU can be 
reformed and how certain inequalities could be addressed.  
The consultations on and the unveiling and subsequent proclamation of the European 
Pillar of Social Rights is the freshest and most comprehensive example of that, showing a face 
of a more welfare-concerned Europe, trying to ensure ‘a future-proof European social model’,85 
and to achieve a ‘social triple-A’ in parallel to its economic one.86 Alongside the Pillar, a 
Reflection Paper specifically focusing on the social dimension of Europe was published in 
2017, presenting three scenarios on the future of Social Europe, out of which the most 
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positively portrayed one was that pushing forward for further social integration, whilst also 
clarifying that the ‘centre of gravity for action in the social field should and will always remain 
with national and local authorities and their social partners’.87  Presented alongside the 
Reflection Paper were some initiatives accompanying the Pillar. These included legal 
initiatives such as the proposal for a work-life balance Directive for parents and carers to repeal 
Council Directive 2010/18/EU on parental leave,88 and consultation documents on addressing 
the challenges of access to social protection for people in all forms of employment and on 
revising the Written Statement Directive, later combined to form a proposal for a Directive on 
transparent and predictable working conditions.89  
The Pillar was initially conceived as an instrument to address the concerns that arose 
from the, authoritarian according to some, governance of the EMU during the crisis.90 It was 
drafted at the outset as applicable to the Euro area, but open to any other Member State wishing 
to be part of it. Upon its proclamation though, its reach was extended through preamble 13 
thereof, which declared that the Pillar is now addressed to all Member States. It is now a set of 
rights and principles that apply throughout the Union, aiming to bolster its commitment to 
welfare. The fact that it was proclaimed shortly after its introduction, is a sign that the EU 
institutions appear serious and committed about it. In fact, there are new power dynamics that 
emerged from the legislative proposals that accompanied the Pillar, which were introduced 
without having previously taken the form of a Framework Agreement between the social 
partners, as in the past. This is because employers’ representatives opposed the proposals, 
leaving the Commission with no other choice than to exercise its legislative initiative. The 
Commission’s stance here is a far cry from that of a liberalising actor that has been traditionally 
perceived to be, suggesting a change of heart towards a more balanced approach between the 
social and the economic constitutions in the course of European Integration.91  
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By no means does the Pillar represent a tectonic shift in the promotion of the Social 
constitution, but it is a significant development nonetheless. Whilst it is a predominantly soft-
law mechanism that risks ending up sidelined in a similar way that the OMC did, its quick 
proclamation might mean that if the resurgent interest continues, in a few years’ time it might 
become legally binding much like the Charter did. The legislative proposals which it anchored, 
moreover, show that soft law may be able to induce binding reforms in the right context. The 
fact that the first preamble to the Pillar refers to social market economy and Article 3 TEU, 
shows this quest for a balanced socio-economic constitution embedded therein. It galvanises 
and normatively enables social constitutionalism to draw level with its economic counterpart. 
This confirms the assumption that traces of social constitutionalism have become more 
prominent and more diffused in the European legal order compared to hitherto. Although not 
part of the analysis in this paper, the looming Brexit, involving the departure of a strong 
opponent of Social Europe, might facilitate that. 
Of course, transformation cannot occur overnight. Path-dependence is strong in the area 
and path-departure takes time, particularly when political consensus is absent. Scharpf’s 
asymmetry has been diffused in the European constitution. Be it as it may, the Lisbon Treaty 
reforms, and particularly the introduction of Article 3(3) TEU is still the elephant in the room 
for some. It represents a constitutional change, although in text only initially. Abandoning free 
market economy for social market economy needs to be acknowledged as a reconciliatory 
paradigmatic swift. After all, nothing in the Treaties prescribes a specified economy policy to 
be followed. Instead, alongside indicators of economic development, one could find social 
objectives, such as full employment and adequate social protection, as well as a commitment 
to protect fundamental rights, which now include social rights according to the Charter. The 
text of the Treaties, is no longer asymmetrical, but can easily accommodate economic policies 
that do not exclusively promote the free market. After all, the free market is dictated by a divine 
power, but rather represents a political choice.92 Moving away from a paradigm exclusively 
focused on that is possible, especially now that the ground has been laid at constitutional level, 
and the EU policy makers have committed themselves to a change. 
Change has been initiated by the various EU institutions, as shown above, 
complemented by a more socially-conscious CJEU, taking into account its reshaped 
environment. The Court has backed down from its liberal stance in the Laval Quartet, and now 
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experiments on how it can syncretise the two –antithetic for many- faces of what constitutes 
the European constitution.93 The scale of the afore-mentioned structural asymmetries that 
impede an amalgamated model to emerge have started to tip, with all actors involved 
attempting to strike a compromise past their own red lines. This has been allowed by the social 
market economy paradigm, which at normative level has shaken off the shackles of liberalism, 
by displacing the realisation of a free market as the leading driver. 
That is not to say that everything has now been remedied. The Treaties might have been 
amended and new policy directions unveiled, but the governance of the EMU remains a serious 
obstacle that has not been fully addressed. The socialisation of the European Semester was an 
effort taken in the wake of the crisis, with the introduction of social benchmarking, 
strengthening of the social OMC, and enhanced country specific recommendation. Whilst the 
success of their actual impact has been contested, with some calling for more ambitious and 
substantial reforms,94 others comment on the significance of the socialisation of processes that 
have for long been interwoven solely with economic policy-making.95 A similar discourse can 
be applied vis-à-vis the Pillar, which despite its initial conception for the EMU, does not 
include any concrete measures capable of changing its structure dramatically. In terms of 
narrative though, it reinforces that attempt for social reorientation, which could come via 
accompanying measures to be unveiled in the near future. For example, the actual details of 
the -rumoured to be unveiled soon- European Social Security Number, might be able to help 
bolster not only an idea of EU social citizenship, but of a commitment to ensuring adequate 
social security and maintaining full employment. 
 The current climate, cultivated primarily through the Treaty reforms and the Pillar, 
might help this reconciliation to materialise. The crisis struck most of the Member States, 
which, in turn chose in most cases the solution of retrenchment.96 This has led to certain degrees 
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of convergence amongst them, at least insofar as the orientation of their social policies is 
concerned.97 In turn, convergent welfare systems would be more easily prone to come together 
when following EU rules. Having national social policies moving downwards and, accordingly, 
EU-wide ones upwards can certainly aid in generating that middle ground among national 
political authorities and EU institutions necessary to advance social integration, and in turn the 
European social constitution, not against but in order to come into balance with the economic 
one.  
At this stage, it becomes clear that the discourses putting emphasis on the sharp and 
irreparable distinction between the terms economic and social, and assuming the subordination 
of the latter to the former, are in need of an overhaul, at least at the normative level of 
constitutionalism’s discursive realm. Both the latest Treaty reforms, as well as the recent 
actions of EU institutions, together with the CJEU, have put forward the seeds for a symbolic 
–to say the least- reorientation of the Union’s values and rationales. This indicates that it is 
anachronistic to still carry on using narratives emphasising the archetypical divide between the 
economic and the social, and that it would be more constructive instead to reconsider the 
narratives used to describe Europe’s constitutional pursuits. That is not to say that economic 
and social are outdated terms; to the contrary, they are still rather pertinent and useful for any 
analysis. More specifically, it is the conceptualisation of their interaction that requires 
redefinition in order to mirror the idea of symbiosis that the new state of play promotes. To a 
considerable extent the present-day developments seem to move toward that direction. 
 The redefinition of the constitutionalism discourse could be confined in the notion of 
symbiotic constitutionalism. It is a term better able to reflect the multidimensional and rather 
pluralistic on-going process the EU is currently experiencing, a process that endeavours to 
reconcile welfare considerations with the demands of a free market. Its meaning is already 
rooted in aspects of European policy-making, exemplified by the triad of Directives aiming at 
approximating Member States laws for workers’ protection in the event of collective 
redundancies, employer’s insolvency and transfer of undertaking, introduced in the late 1970s 
and underpinned by a balanced view between the Union’s economic and social components.  
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As with every ongoing experiment, pitfalls would occur. The development of this new quasi-
grundnorm is unlikely to be linear and unproblematic; after all economic imperatives retained 
the upper hand for too long. It is therefore almost natural that conflicts would arise, whereby 
the past would revive in flashbacks of ‘ruthless’ capitalism, on whose altar social policy is to 
be sacrificed.98 Such occurrences can happen in the course of any integrationist rationale, even 
a pro-social one, but the new norms embedded at constitutional level should be enough of a 
compass for things to stabilise over time, in order to bear witness of the said path-departure.99  
Equally it does not mean that this form of constitutionalism would miraculously bestow 
an ideal regime on the EU; that could only happen in a utopia, as restrictions are inevitably 
going to be part of the deal.100 Yet, coining this new era of European constitutionalism is 
important, first and foremost because it heralds a change of discourse, in which positive 
connotations underpin the debate and, subsequently, the relevant stakeholders’ actions. 
Otherwise, falling into a continuum of the economic v social constitutionalism debate, and 
persisting with the acceptance of a relationship premised on subordination from the outset will 
only perpetuate the status quo. Semantics are important in the constitutional debate. They 
become even more important when a ruthless free market economic paradigm is not prescribed 
in the Treaties, but given the symbiotic relationship, reconciliating policies are being called for 
therein, not only through the high-level provision of social market economy, but also through 
the more tangible ones of the Pillar and its accompanying initiatives.  
These reforms could be further bolstered, once the social renaissance sought by the 
Commission is underway, and Member States’ attitude towards it has become accommodating, 
if not for nothing else than to reap politically the positive impact these reforms might have on 
the population. Symbiotic constitutionalism, based on the premiss of a social market economy, 
does not seek to overturn economic traditions. Its contribution is found in the introduction or 
reinforcement or a series of protective measures that could easily maintain high levels of social 
welfare in times of need. Using a modified version of the proposed European Labour Authority 
to ensure adequate standards of work and social protection through conditionality-based 
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practices for example, can bear fruits, and will certainly not disgruntle EU citizens, unlike the 
financial incentives granted to Member States for pursuing retrenchment and deregulation 
during the crisis. The Treaty regime even at its current stage, can support more interventionist 
policies, which can be at a supervisory and coordinating level with the necessary carrots and 
sticks. There is no Treaty-imposed ban on such things; to the contrary an adopted social 
constitutionalism discourse is capable of ensuring that economic and social prosperity are on 
par. 
As Polanyi noted, economic capitalism might seek to canonise free market, but the then 
dislocated society would demand social protection and welfare.101 Symbiotic constitutionalism 
as a term seeks to bridge this antithetic pair. It may be that the European constitution is a sui 
generis form of one, due to its participatory deficiencies, yet its normative changes with Lisbon 
might give enough of a push into the creation of binding norms, ‘to shape the political, social 
and economic direction of the [EU] polity’.102 The notions and objectives associated with 
welfare were gradually normatively and ideologically enhanced, turning themselves into tools 
to instigate a transformation. The embeddedness of the social market economy together with 
the transformation of the policy debate through the Pillar reforms and package has laid the 
groundwork for the realisation of that ideal. If ideas change, then practice is likely to follow 
suit, at least according to my –potentially optimistic- view, that considers symbiotic 
constitutionalism as a positive self-fulfilling prophecy. Only time will tell. 
 
7. CONCLUSION 
 
This paper set out and reflected upon the viability of a more profound social constitution for 
the EU as an equal counterpart to the economic one, by introducing the concept of symbiotic 
constitutionalism. The analysis began by assuming that the terms constitution and EU can be 
compatible, forming a post-modern, supranational, sui generis community boasting its own 
distinct norms and values.103 It then focused on presenting the key manifestations of the core 
discourses on European socio-economic constitutionalism and delving further into their 
interaction. Economic constitutionalism has been perceived by many to be synonymous with 
the story of an evolving Europe; fundamental freedoms, free competition and market 
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harmonisation being its pinnacles, found at the forefront of most EU developments. Yet 
gradually, integration efforts sought to go beyond the confines of economic imperatives as the 
EU was setting out to become a properly federalised entity.  
Progressively, social considerations were embraced, and measures tackling welfare-
related issues at EU level emerged. Alongside those initiatives, a new wave of scholarship 
surfaced dealing with the social aspects –and aspirations- of the EU, or, in other words, with 
the idea of social constitutionalism. Social constitutionalism was some sort of a late bloomer, 
coming forth while its economic counterpart was already rather mature. This led many scholars 
to investigate their interaction. From those studies, no consensus could be reached. Some 
proclaimed that economic constitutionalism was so sophisticated and entrenched to the 
integration process, that it would dominate over any (re-)socialising efforts. Others put forward 
a more optimist account, where social constitutionalism could stand on its feet and 
complement, to various degrees, its economic peer. For most though, it was dubious that 
economic and social constitutionalism would ever become equals. Contrasting narratives of 
progress, on the one hand, and scepticism, on the other, seem to co-exist, blurring the lines of 
Europe’s quest for its constitutional identity.104 
 The new millennium brought the failed Constitutional Treaty with the concept of social 
market economy as a new objective for the Union, a concept that was retained, albeit under 
different context, in the Lisbon reforms. This refuelled the interest on Europe’s social 
aspirations, although once again lacking harmonious views. It was modestly welcomed at best, 
with some perspectives emphasising the structural asymmetries of integration that would allow 
economic concerns to run over social ones. It is important to bear in mind that during the same 
period the Court handed its judgments in a series of cases known as the Laval Quartet, resulting 
in the outcry of its downright neoliberal stance by the academic community and fuelling the 
afore-mentioned deterministic accounts. This obviously detracted attention from other relevant 
institutional developments in the field, highlighting the significance of the Court in giving 
directions in regards to the EU’s welfare orientation.  
In the absence of an enhanced political integration, it was left to the EU institutions, the 
Court being a prominent component of them, to set the Union’s constitutional priorities.105 
Inasmuch as the Court plays a significant part therein, its entirely anti-social stance did not last 
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long, and was not as uniform as first suggested to be. More recent case law, has shown that the 
Court does not adopt a very consistent approach, meaning that at times it may show a much 
more pro-welfare attitude, probably taking into account the societal, institutional and Treaty 
changes that arose. In that sense, the constitutional significance of the Lisbon changes was 
somewhat overlooked and underappreciated. It remains to be seen whether the Pillar and its 
associated initiatives would give the required push for the Court, and the Union as a whole to 
further socialise its vocabulary. At theoretical level though, moving forward, the adoption of 
the concept of symbiotic constitutionalism represents a useful analytical and explanatory tool, 
best positioned to describe the current regime. As such, it needs to be embedded in the relevant 
narratives and discussions.  The Promethean vision of Social Europe advanced by Freedland 
and Countouris, has already made its first steps post-Lisbon, and it is time, as they rightly note, 
to leave pessimism as well as claims about social constitutionalism’s unresponsiveness behind, 
and acknowledge that a change of direction might be about to happen.106 Strong path-
dependence exists, but the first signs of a path-departure have emerged at EU level, based on a 
–finally- symbiotic relationship between the notions of economic and social constitutionalism. 
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